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Abstract—Existing wireless communication systems have been
mainly designed to provide substantial gain in terms of data
rates. However, 5G and Beyond will depart from this scheme,
with the objective not only to provide services with higher data
rates. One of the main goals is to support massive machine-type
communications (mMTC) in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) appli-
cations. Supporting massive uplink communications for devices
with sporadic traffic pattern and short-packet size, as it is in
many mMTC use cases, is a challenging task, particularly when
the control signaling is not negligible in size compared to the
payload. In addition, channel estimation becomes challenging
for sporadic and short-packet transmission due to the limited
number of employed pilots. In this paper, a new uplink multiple
access (MA) scheme is proposed for mMTC, which can support
a large number of uncoordinated IoT devices with short-packet
and sporadic traffic. The proposed uplink MA scheme removes
the overheads associated with the device identifier as well as
pilots and preambles related to channel estimation. An alternative
mechanism for device identification is proposed, where a unique
spreading code is dedicated to each IoT device as identifier.
This unique code is simultaneously used for the spreading pur-
pose and device identification. Different IoT device identification
algorithms which employ sparse signal reconstruction methods
are proposed to determine the active IoT devices prior to data
detection. Specifically, the Bayesian information criterion model
order selection method is employed to develop an IoT device iden-
tification algorithm for unknown and time-varying probability of
device activity. Our proposed MA scheme benefits from a new
non-coherent nonlinear multiuser detection algorithm designed
on the basis of unsupervised machine learning techniques to
enable data detection without a priori knowledge on channel state
information. The effectiveness of the proposed MA scheme for
known and unknown probability of activity and high overloading
factor is supported by simulation results.
Index Terms—Internet-of-Things (IoT), massive machine-type
communications (mMTC), Beyond 5G, uplink multiple access,
simultaneous sparse signal reconstruction, nonlinear multiuser
detection, sporadic transmission, machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
MASSIVE UPLINK connectivity is the key factor inthe realization of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), as part
of 5G and Beyond wireless communication systems [1]. In
many IoT applications, massive machine-type communications
(mMTC) services are required, where a large number of de-
vices transmit very short packets sporadically. Typically, the
number of IoT devices assigned to each base station (BS) in
mMTC is in orders of magnitude above what current com-
munication networks are capable to support. Moreover, IoT
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devices do not transmit continuously, rather updates are in-
frequently transmitted to the BS, whenever a measured value
changes. Hence, small packets are expected to carry critical
payload in mMTC [2]. For example, Sigfox as one of the
most adopted solutions for IoT, has been designed to support
a packet payload of 12 bytes.
The design of the current wireless communication systems
relies on the assumption that the control signaling related to
physical (PHY) and media access control (MAC) layers is of
negligible size compared to the payload. Thus, heuristic design
of control signaling is acceptable and does not affect the over-
all system performance. However, in mMTC with short-packet
transmission, the control signaling can be similar in size with
the payload; thus, inefficient design of control signaling leads
to highly suboptimal transmission schemes. Excessive control
signaling, e.g., the overheads, preambles, and pilots associated
with device identifier, exploited for channel estimation, and
used for random access procedure, hinders massive connec-
tivity [3]. Thus, efficient multiple access (MA) schemes with
highly limited (or non-existent) control signaling are required.
Moreover, channel estimation is another challenge for spo-
radic and short-packet transmission, especially for a massive
number of non-orthogonal transmissions. Existing channel es-
timation approaches are often based on the assumption that
devices are active over long periods so that channel estimation
through pilots and preambles is feasible. However, if an IoT
device only transmits occasionally, such an assumption cannot
longer be valid. Instead, channel estimation has to rely on a
single transmission that may be very short, which constrains
the number of pilots available to keep the overhead low [4].
Channel estimation becomes more challenging in the grant-
free (GF) uplink MA scheme, where resources are randomly
selected by devices.
The conventional request-grant and GF uplink MA schemes
cannot provide massive connectivity since the maximum num-
ber of supported devices is limited by the number and schedul-
ing granularity of orthogonal resources. Hence, uplink MA
schemes based on non-orthogonal transmission are required
to boost up the uplink connectivity in mMTC. In addition,
the handshaking mechanism in the conventional MA schemes
require excessive control signaling in the random access pro-
cedure, which makes them inefficient for mMTC [5].
Motivated by these facts, a new uplink MA scheme for
short-packet and sporadic traffic in mMTC is proposed in this
paper. The main idea behind the proposed MA scheme is to
reduce the control signaling while simultaneously supporting
a massive number of uncoordinated IoT devices with a single
BS. The proposed MA scheme is designed based on asyn-
chronous direct-sequence spread spectrum (DS-SS) with non-
orthogonal spreading codebook, and is capable of supporting
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2undetermined DS-SS systems in static networks, where the BS
and IoT devices are immobile.
To remove the control signaling associated with the IoT
device identifier, a unique spreading code is dedicated to each
IoT device which is simultaneously used for the spreading
purpose and device identification. In a nutshell, instead of allo-
cating a fragment of the IoT packet to the signaling associated
with the MAC address (device identifier), the unique spread-
ing code is used as IoT device identifier. Moreover, the MA
scheme relies on an unsupervised machine learning technique
to enable non-coherent data detection, thus removing the need
of preambles and pilots used for channel estimation. The lack
of preambles and pilots further reduces the control signaling.
Our proposed approach for removing the device identifier
relies on sparsity-aware IoT device identification at the BS to
determine the active IoT devices before data detection. Based
on the sporadic traffic pattern of the IoT devices as well as lack
of knowledge about the channel state information (CSI) of the
IoT devices, the squared `2-norm sparse signal reconstruction
(SSR) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) `1−`2 mixed-
norm simultaneous sparse signal reconstruction (SSSR) IoT
device identification algorithms are developed. In the former
algorithm, the IoT identification problem is formulated as an
SSR using the generalized cross-validation (GCV) approach
followed by parallel hypothesis testing. The latter algorithm
formulates the IoT device identification problem as a BIC
model order selection SSSR problem. Unlike existing sparsity-
aware activity detection algorithms, the BIC `1 − `2 mixed-
norm SSSR IoT device identification algorithm can determine
active devices, when the probability of activity is unknown
and time-varying.
The proposed uplink MA scheme is also equipped with a
new non-coherent nonlinear multiuser detection (MUD) algo-
rithm to detect data of the active IoT devices, applied after
the IoT device identification algorithms. We propose the non-
coherent 2-mean clustering (2-MC)-MUD algorithm based on
2-MC unsupervised machine learning and differential coding
to detect data without channel estimation at the BS.
A. Related Works
The problem of jointly detecting both activity and data in
code division multiple access (CDMA), when the probability
of activity is known at the BS has been studied in [6]–[8].
However, the developed algorithms either assume perfect CSI
or estimate CSI at the BS. Also, they have considered co-
ordinated CDMA with perfectly synchronized transmissions
and solve the problem through compressive sensing recovery
algorithms based on either the convex relaxation or the greedy
optimization algorithms. Besides, these algorithms do not pro-
pose any solution how to set the tuning parameter in the opti-
mization problem in the signal recovery procedure. The degree
of sparsity, and thus, the false alarm and correct identification
rates depend on the value of the tuning parameter.
The authors in [9] studied the problem of joint channel esti-
mation and detection of activity and data for sporadic commu-
nications. However, they considered coordinated transmission
with a priori known probability of activity for devices. Also,
the accuracy of the joint activity and data detection depends
on the length of pilot employed for channel estimation. In
[6], the authors develop sparsity-aware maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP) detector for the coordinated CDMA and
obtain a close-form expression for the tuning parameter as a
function of the probability of user activity. However, this al-
gorithm assumes that the channel matrix is perfectly known at
the BS. The problem of sparsity-aware successive interference
cancellation (SIC) for mMTC has been investigated in [10],
[11]. The authors in [12] have employed compressive sens-
ing MUD in slotted ALOHA. Approximate message passing
(AMP)-based user activity detection algorithm which exploits
the statistics of the wireless channel for the uplink has been
investigated in [13], [14]. Recently, device activity detection
and channel estimation for massive connectivity in massive
multiple-input and multiple-output has been studied in [15].
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• A new uplink MA scheme is proposed for mMTC. The
proposed MA scheme exhibits the following advantages:
– It is capable to support thousands of uncoordinated
IoT devices;
– It supports sporadic traffic pattern and short-packet;
– It significantly reduces packet time on-air since it
is designed for underdetermined DS-SS (number of
devices is larger than the spreading factor);
– It removes the control signaling associated with the
device identifier to reduce uplink packet overhead;
– It removes preambles and pilot employed for channel
estimation to reduce uplink overhead;
– It exhibits high scalability in terms of adding new
IoT devices (high overloading factor) without nega-
tively affecting the system performance.
• A new mechanism for the IoT device identification at the
BS is developed instead of using device identifier. Since
the active IoT devices in the network do not use a device
identifier in order to identify themselves to the BS, the
squared `2-norm SSR and the BIC `1 − `2 mixed-norm
SSSR IoT identification algorithms are proposed to detect
active IoT devices. The proposed algorithms exhibit the
following advantages:
– They can detect active IoT devices without knowl-
edge of the CSI;
– They remove the need for matched-filter (MF) im-
plementation for all spreading codes; thus reducing
the complexity of the receiver;
– The BIC `1−`2 mixed-norm SSSR IoT device iden-
tification can identify active IoT devices when the
probability of activity is unknown and time-varying.
• The statistical performance analysis of the squared `2-
norm SSR IoT device identification algorithm is presented,
and closed-form expressions for the correct identification
and false alarm rates are derived.
• A new non-coherent nonlinear MUD algorithm, i.e., 2-MC-
MUD in combination with differential coding is designed
for short packet transmission. The proposed 2-MC-MUD
algorithm exhibits the following advantages:
– It supports both coordinated and uncoordinated DS-SS
transmission irrespective of the traffic pattern;
3Fig. 1: Single-hop IoT network with sporadic traffic pattern.
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Fig. 2: Received packets at the BS.
– It does not require knowledge of the CSI at the BS.
B. Notations
Random variables are displayed in sans serif upright fonts,
while their realizations are shown in serif, italic fonts. Vectors
and matrices are denoted by bold lowercase and uppercase
letters, respectively. For example, a random variable and its
realization are denoted by x and x; a random vector and its
realization are denoted by x and x; a random matrix and its
realization are denoted by X and X , respectively. Sets and
random sets are denoted by upright sans serif and calligraphic
font, respectively. For example, a random set and its realization
are denoted by X and X , respectively.
The identity matrix and zero vector are shown by I and 0,
and the indicator function is defined as I
{
x
}
= 1 if x is true;
otherwise, I
{
x
}
= 0. The cardinality of a set, which measures
the number of elements of the set, is denoted by card(·). The
`0 quasi-norm of vector aj = [a0,j a1,j . . . am−1,j ]† and
the `0 − `0 quasi-norm of matrix A , [a0 a1 . . . an−1] are
respectively defined as ‖aj‖0 , card
({
i ∈ I∣∣ai,j 6= 0}),
and ‖A‖0 , card
({
i ∈ I∣∣∃j, j = 0, 1, . . . , n−1, ai,j 6= 0}),
where I , {0, 1, . . . ,m}. We use tr(B), B−1 and det(B) to
show the trace, inverse, and determinant of an square matrix
B. We also employ diag(B) to represent the diagonal ele-
ments of B in vector form. Throughout the paper, (·)∗, (·)†,
and (·)H show the complex conjugate, transpose, and Hermi-
tian transpose, respectively. Also, | · |, b·c, and ⊗ represent the
absolute value operator, floor function, and Kronecker product,
respectively. E{·} is the statistical expectation, xˆ is an estimate
of x, ∪ is the logical OR operator, and ∩ is the logical AND
operator. The complex Gaussian distribution with mean vector
µ and covariance matrix Σ is denoted by CN (µ,Σ).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the system model. Section III describes the
proposed IoT device identification algorithms and presents
their analytical performance evaluation. In Section IV, the
data detection problem is discussed, and the nonlinear 2-MC-
MUD algorithm is proposed. Simulation results are provided
in Section V, and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider Ku IoT devices communicating with a single IoT
BS in a single-hop communication, as shown in Fig. 1. It is
considered that the IoT devices transmit data in short pack-
ets over independent doubly block fading channel, where the
fading channel is block fading in time and in frequency. The
probability of packet transmission for each IoT device is as-
sumed to be Pa.1 The IoT devices transmit their packet after
receiving a beacon signal transmitted by the IoT BS. This sig-
nal is periodically transmitted with period Tt = NsTs + τmax,
where Ns is the number of symbols per IoT packet, Ts is
the symbol duration, and τmax is the known maximum delay
of the single-hop IoT network. It is assumed that Tt equals
the coherence time of the fading channel. The coherence time
of the wireless channel in suburban locations is approximately
0.5s. The coherence bandwidth of wireless channel is typically
in the range of 100 kHz to 1MHz. Thus, the coherence block
is in the range of 5× 104 to 5× 105 chips.
We denote Xu , {0, 1, . . . ,Ku − 1} and Xa the total and
active IoT devices in the network, respectively. The round-
trip delay of the kth IoT device is shown by τk , 2`k/c,
τk ∈ [0, τmax], where c is the speed of light, and `k is the
distance between the k-th IoT device and the BS. We consider
that τk, k,∈ Xu, is known at the receiver. Fig. 2 illustrates the
received IoT packets at the BS.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, for each IoT device, the payload bits
dk, k ∈ Xa, are encoded by the channel encoder to increase
the reliability of packet transmission. Then, the encoded data
is passed through the differential encoding block. Differential
encoding is employed to remove the need of channel estima-
tion in the MUD at the BS to enable non-coherent detection.
After differential encoding, the data is multiplied by a unique
spreading waveform. It is considered that the spreading wave-
forms of the IoT devices do not change over time. Finally, the
DS-SS signal is binary phase-shift-keying (BPSK) modulated
and then transmitted.
The impulse response of the doubly block fading channel
for the kth IoT device is given as hk(t) ≈ g˘kδ(t− τk), where
g˘k is the fading coefficient of the kth IoT device, which is
constant during a packet but changes to an independent value
for the next packet. The received baseband signal over doubly
block fading channel in each transmission period with respect
to the timing reference of the BS is modeled as
r(t)=
Ku−1∑
k=0
Ns−1∑
n=0
g˘k
√
ηkpke
jφkbk,nsk(t− nTs − τk) + w(t)
=
Ku−1∑
k=0
Ns−1∑
n=0
gkbk,nsk(t− nTs − τk) + w(t), (1)
1Both known and unknown probability of activity are studied in this paper.
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Fig. 3: Block diagram that illustrates packet transmission at IoT devices.
where t ∈ [0, Tt], gk , g˘k√ηkpkejφk , and g˘k, φk, and
{
bk,n,
n = 0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1
}
respectively denote the fading channel
coefficient, carrier phase (CP), and symbol stream of the kth
IoT device, which are unknown at the BS. Also, ηk =
(
λc
4pi`k
)2
and pk denote the pathloss and transmit power of the kth
IoT device, respectively, where λc is the wavelength of the
carrier signal. It is considered that g˘k ∼ CN
(
µk, σ
2
k
)
, and the
envelope of the CSI, i.e., |g˘k| has a Rician distribution with
K-factor |µk|2/(σ2k). The symbol stream for the inactive IoT
devices is modeled as transmitting zeros during the packet,
i.e., bk,n = 0, n = 0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1, while active IoT devices
employ BPSK modulation with E{|bk,n|2} = 1. The DS-SS
signaling waveform of the kth IoT device, sk (t), is given by
sk(t) =
Nc−1∑
m=0
c
(m)
k ψ(t−mTc), t ∈ [0, Ts] , (2)
where Tc is the chip duration, ck =
[
c
(0)
k c
(1)
k . . . c
(Nc−1)
k
]†
is the spreading sequence of {+1,−1} assigned to the kth IoT
device, Nc is the spreading factor, and ψ(t) is the chip wave-
form with unit power. It is assumed that ψ(t) is a rectangular
pulse confined within [0, Tc]. To support massive connectivity,
Ku > Nc, which leads to non-orthogonal transmission. The
baseband additive complex Gaussian noise at the output of the
receive filter with bandwidth 1/Tc is denoted by w(t).
Fig. 4 shows the block diagram of the proposed receiver at
the IoT BS. As seen, the received baseband signal is passed
through the chip MF and sampled at the chip rate. The output
of the sampled chip MF for the ith chip at the jth observation
symbol is obtained as
r
(i)
j ,
∫ jTs+(i+1)Tc
jTs+iTc
r(t)ψ (t− jTs − iTc) dt (3)
=
Ku−1∑
k=0
gku
(i)
k,j + w
(i)
j i = 0, 1, . . . , Nc − 1,
where
w
(i)
j ,
∫ jTs+(i+1)Tc
jTs+iTc
w(t)ψ (t− jTs − iTc) dt, (4)
and
u
(i)
k,j ,
∫ jTs+(i+1)Tc
jTs+iTc
Ns−1∑
n=0
bk,nsk(t− nTs − τk) (5)
ψ(t− jTs − iTc)dt.
By employing (4), one can show that the joint probability den-
sity function (PDF) of the corresponding noise vector associ-
ated with the jth observation vector, i.e., wj ,
[
w
(0)
j w
(1)
j . . .
w
(Nc−1)
j
]†
is characterized by wj ∼ CN
(
0Nc , σ
2
wI
)
with
σ2w , N0/Tc, where N0/2 is the power spectral density of
the white noise. The integral in (5) represents the area under
the received signal waveform of the kth IoT device during
the ith chip-matched filtering duration at the jth observation
symbol.
Let us write the delay of the kth IoT as
τk , αkTs + βkTc + ξk, (6)
with αk , bτk/Tsc, βk , bτk/Tcc − αkNc, and ξk ∈ [0, Tc).
Based on the values of αk, βk, and ξk, u
(i)
k,j in (5) is ex-
pressed as a function of bk,j−αk and bk,j−αk−1 as [16]
u
(i)
k,j ,
Ns−1∑
n=0
Nc−1∑
m=0
c
(m)
k bk,n (7)
×
∫ jTs+(i+1)Tc
jTs+iTc
ψ(t− nTs −mTc − τk)ψ(t− jTs − iTc)dt
= bk,j−αk−1x
(i)
k (1− ξk) + bk,j−αkx(i)k (ξk),
where
x
(i)
k (ν),
Nc−1∑
m=0
c
(m)
k
∫ (i+1)Tc
iTc
ψ(t−mTc − νTc)ψ(t− iTc)dt, (8)
with ν ∈ [0, 1). We can write (7) in vector form as follows
uk,j = bk,j−αk−1xk,0 + bk,j−αkxk,1 (9)
where bk,j = 0 when j /∈ [0, Ns − 1], and
uk,j ,
[
u
(0)
k,j u
(1)
k,j . . . u
(Nc−1)
k,j
]†
(10a)
xk,1 ,
[
x
(0)
k (ξk) x
(1)
k (ξk) . . . x
(Nc−1)
k (ξk)
]†
(10b)
xk,0 ,
[
x
(0)
k (1− ξk) x(1)k (1− ξk) . . . x(Nc−1)k (1− ξk)
]†
.
For the rectangular chip waveform pulse-shaping ψ(t), one
can easily obtain[
xk,1
xk,0
]
= (1− ξk)
 0βkck
0Nc−βk
+ ξk
 0βk+1ck
0Nc−βk−1
 . (11)
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Xˆa
{
bˆmk0 , . . . , bˆ
m
kKˆa−1
}
{
bˆck0 , . . . , bˆ
c
kKˆa−1
}dˆk0
...
dˆkKˆa−1
Fig. 4: Block diagram of the proposed receiver at the BS.
Let us define Xk ,
[
xk,0 xk,1
]
. By employing (3) and (9),
the jth observation vector, i.e., rj ,
[
r
(0)
j r
(1)
j . . . r
(Nc−1)
j
]†
,
is written as follows
rj = XGbj + wj = Xhj + wj , (12)
where
X ,
[
X0 X1 . . . XKu−1
]
, (13)
G ,

g0 0
g1
0
. . .
gKu−1
⊗ I2, (14)
bj ,
[
b0,j−α0−1 b0,j−α0 b1,j−α1−1 b1,j−α1 . . . (15)
bKu−1,j−α(Ku−1)−1 bKu−1,j−α(Ku−1)
]†
,
and
hj,
[
h0,j,0 h0,j,1 h1,j,0 h1,j,1 . . . hKu−1,j,0 hKu−1,j,1
]†
(16)
with
hk,j,f , gkbk,j−αk−1+f , f ∈ {0, 1}. (17)
Finally, by staking the Nt observation vectors, the observation
matrix is written as follows
RT = XGBT + WT = XHT + WT, (18)
where RT , [r0 r1 . . . rNt−1], BT , [b0 b1 . . . bNt−1],
WT , [w0 w1 . . . wNt−1], and HT , [h0 h1 . . . hNt−1].
In (18), X is referred to as dictionary.
As seen in Fig. 4, after chip-matched filtering and sam-
pling, the IoT device identification algorithm is applied to the
measurement matrix R¯ to detect the active IoT devices. The
outcome of the IoT device identification algorithm is a set of
IoT devices Xˆa. Then, the MUD algorithm is applied to detect
data of the IoT devices in Xˆa.
III. IOT DEVICE IDENTIFICATION
Device identification is the first step in uplink MA schemes
that devices do not use control signaling in order to identify
themselves to the BS. In this case, the BS needs to deter-
mine the active devices before data detection. In this section,
different IoT device identification algorithms are developed.
A. IoT Device Identification: Problem Formulation
For the sake of decreasing the complexity, a portion of the
observation window can be employed for IoT device identi-
fication. Let us consider a truncated observation window of
length L as follows
R = XGB + W = XH + W, (19)
where R , [rα¯ rα¯+1 . . . rα¯+L−1], B , [bα¯ bα¯+1 . . . bα¯+L−1],
W , [wα¯ wα¯+1 . . . wα¯+L−1], and H , [hα¯ hα¯+1 . . . hα¯+L−1]
with 1 6 L 6 Ns + αmin − α¯, where α¯ is an arbitrary
positive integer, α¯ > αmax , max{α0, α1, . . . , αKu−1}, and
αmin , min{α0, α1, . . . , αKu−1}.2 Fig. 5 shows the under-
determined system of linear equations in (18), and Fig. 6
illustrates truncated observation windows for IoT device iden-
tification in (19).
The activity of an IoT device is defined for an entire packet,
i.e, the rows of H corresponding to the active and inactive IoT
devices are non-zero and zero, respectively. Thus, the problem
of IoT device identification for the kth IoT device, k ∈ Xu,
can be expressed as the following binary hypothesis testing:
H1k : hk,α¯,L 6= 0 (20)
H0k : hk,α¯,L = 0,
where
hk,α¯,L ,
[
h†k,α¯h
†
k,α¯+1 . . . h
†
k,α¯+L−1
]†
, (21a)
hk,j ,
[
hk,j,0 hk,j,1
]†
, (21b)
and H0k and H1k are the null and alternative hypotheses
denoting that the kth IoT device is active and inactive, respec-
tively. As seen in (20), the IoT device identification problem is
formulated as Ku parallel binary hypothesis testing problems.
The first step in IoT device identification is to reconstruct
hk,α¯,L, k ∈ Xu, from the truncated observation matrix in (19).
However, (19) represents an underdetermined system of linear
equations since Nc < Ku. Hence, it is not uniquely solvable.
Let us denote the number of active IoT devices by the ran-
dom variable ka = card(Xa). For Pa  1, P{ka  Ku} = 1,
and thus, B and H in (19) are sparse matrices. Moreover,
2The number of non-zero elements of the observation window for the active
IoT devices is considered the same to facilitate theoretical analysis.
6= =
XR¯
H¯
X
G B¯
Fig. 5: Underdetermined system of linear equations for Ku = 7, Ka = 2, Nt = 8, Nc = 5, αmax = 1, and Ns = 6. Due to the asynchronicity
among the IoT devices, the matrix of the transmitted symbols B¯ includes two rows for each IoT device.
the columns of H(B) share the same sparsity profiles. This
sparse structure is referred to as block-sparse. The block-sparse
structure of H can be observed in Fig. 5.
The sparse structure of H can be employed to reconstruct
the columns of H from the underdetermined linear observa-
tion model in (19). When each column of H is individually
reconstructed from its corresponding column in R, it is re-
ferred to as SSR. The SSR for the columns of H, i.e., hj ,
α¯ 6 j 6 α¯+ L− 1, is formulated as follows
hˆj = arg min
hj
1
2
∥∥rj −Xhj∥∥2F + λ`0∥∥hj∥∥0, (22)
where λ`0 is the tuning parameter which balances both ap-
proximation error and sparsity level of the solution.
The `0-minimization in (22) is both numerically unstable
and NP-hard since the `0 quasi-norm is a discrete-value func-
tion. One approach to the SSR is to replace the `0 quasi-norm
by a convex function with common sparsity profile that leads
to a solution very close to the one of the original problem.
This method is called convex relaxation and converts the com-
binatorial problem in (22) into a convex optimization problem
which can be solved in polynomial time. Different convex
functions can be employed to relax ‖hj‖0 in (22). A common
family of convex functions is the `q norm, given as
∥∥hj∥∥q =
Ku−1∑
k=0
1∑
f=0
∣∣∣hk,j,f ∣∣∣q
 1q . (23)
The recovered vectors by the `q norm minimization can be
employed to infer the active IoT set Xa.
On the other hand, the block-sparse structure of H can be
employed to improve the reconstruction of H in (22). This
method of signal reconstruction is referred to as SSSR. Op-
posite to SSR, the SSSR simultaneously exploits the column
sparsity along with the block-sparse structure in the optimiza-
tion problem in order to reconstruct the matrix H. The SSSR
of H, given R and the dictionary X , is expressed as
Hˆ = arg min
H
1
2
∥∥R−XH∥∥2
F
+ λ`0`0
∥∥H∥∥
0
, (24)
where λ`0`0 is the tuning parameter which balances both ap-
proximation error and sparsity level of the solution. Similar to
the `0-minimization in (22), the `0 − `0-minimization in (24)
is unstable and NP-hard. Therefore, the quasi-norm
∥∥H∥∥
0
is
replaced with the `p − `q (p, q > 1) mixed-norm as
Jp,q(H) =
Ku−1∑
k=0
∥∥hk,α¯,L∥∥pq (25)
H (α¯ = 4) H (α¯ = 3)H¯
α0 = 0
{
α1 = 2
{
α2 = 1
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Fig. 6: Different observation windows for IoT device identification
(Ku = 7, Ns = 7, αmax = 2, αmin = 0, 1 6 L 6 4). The purple
color is employed to show the packet of the IoT devices, which is
zero for inactive and non-zero for active IoT devices.
to convert the combinatorial problem in (24) into a convex
optimization problem. The recovered matrix by the relaxed
SSSR can also be employed to infer the active IoT set.
B. IoT Device Identification for Known Probability of Activity
Here, we propose an algorithm for IoT device identification
when the probability of activity Pa is known at the BS. Con-
vex relation through squared `2-norm followed by a threshold
setting mechanism is employed for IoT device identification.
1) Squared `2-Norm SSR IoT Device Identification: The
squared `2-norm convex relaxation form of (22) is given by
hˆj = arg min
hj
1
2
∥∥rj −Xhj∥∥2F + λ∥∥hj∥∥22, (26)
where hj is given in (16). The squared `2-norm SSR algorithm
formulates the IoT identification problem as a ridge regression
(RD) estimation problem as in (26) followed by Ku parallel
binary hypothesis testing problems. This is because the RD
does not set the coefficients of hˆj to zero. The optimal solution
of (26) is obtained as [17]
hˆj =
(
X†X + 2λI
)−1
X†rj , (27)
which is a simple linear estimator of rj that shrinks ordinary
least-squares (LS) estimates towards zero. The tuning param-
eter λ for SSR can be obtained through cross-validation and
generalized cross-validation (GCV) [18], [19]. The latter is a
method of model selection that is widely employed; in this
case, λ is obtained as follows [18]
λcv = arg min
λ
∥∥(I −Q)rj∥∥22[
tr
(
I −Q)]2 , (28)
whereQ ,X
(
X†X+2λI
)−1
X†. In [20], it has been shown
that the optimal tuning parameter of the RD estimator for rj =
7Xhj + wj in terms of minimum mean squared error can be
approximated as follows
λopj ≈
σ2w tr
[
Σ¯
−1
X
]
hHj Σ¯
−1
X hj + 3 tr
[
Σ¯
−2
X
] , (29)
where Σ¯X , X†X . As observed, λopj depends on hj which
is unknown and needs to be estimated by the RD estima-
tor. In this case, for moderate and high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) range, an approximation of (29) can be obtained by
replacing hHj Σ¯
−1
X hj with its expected value [21]. Since the
elements of hj are uncorrelated, by employing E
{|hk,j,0|2} =
E
{|hk,j,1|2} = Paηkpk(σ2k + |µk|2), k ∈ Xu, we can show
that E
{
hHj Σ¯
−1
X hj
}
= Pa(Γ
†⊗1†)Λ¯X , where Γ , [γ0 γ1 . . .
γKu−1]
†, γk , ηkpk(σ2k + |µk|2), 12 = [1 1]†, and Λ¯X ,
diag(Σ¯−1X ). Substituting E
{
hHj Σ¯
−1
X hj
}
= Pa(Γ
† ⊗ 1†)Λ¯X
into (29), results in
λopt ≈ σ
2
wtr
[
Σ¯
−1
X
]
Pa(Γ† ⊗ 1†)Λ¯X + 3tr
[
Σ¯
−2
X
] . (30)
As seen in (30), λopt is inversely proportional to Pa.
By substituting rj = Xhj +wj in (12) into (27), hˆj can be
written as a linear function of hj as
hˆj = Ωhj + w
′
j , (31)
where
Ω ,

Ω0,0 Ω0,1 . . . Ω0,2Ku−1
Ω1,0 Ω1,1 . . . Ω1,2Ku−1
...
...
. . .
...
Ω2Ku−1,0 Ω2Ku−1,1 . . . Ω2Ku−1,2Ku−1
 (32)
= I − 2λopt(Σ¯X + 2λoptI)−1,
and
w′j ,

w′0,j,0
w′0,j,1
...
w′Ku−1,j,0
w′Ku−1,j,1
 =
(
Σ¯X + 2λ
optI
)−1
X†wj . (33)
In (33), w′j is zero-mean complex Gaussian colored noise
vector with covariance matrix given by
Σw
′ ,

Σw
′
0,0 Σ
w′
0,1 . . . Σ
w′
0,2Ku−1
Σw
′
1,0 Σ
w′
1,1 . . . Σ
w′
1,2Ku−1
...
...
. . .
...
Σw
′
2Ku−1,0 Σ
w′
2Ku−1,1 . . . Σ
w′
2Ku−1,2Ku−1

= E
{
w′j
(
w′j
)H}
= σ2w
(
Σ¯X + 2λ
optI)
−2
Σ¯X , (34)
where Σw
′
2k1+f1,2k2+f2
= E
{
w′k1,j,f1(w
′
k2,j,f2
)∗
}
.
The elements of hˆj in (31) associated with the kth IoT
device, i.e., hˆk,j,0 and hˆk,j,1 can be written as follows
hˆk,j,f = Ω2k+f,2k+fhk,j,f + Ω2k+f,2k+f¯hk,j,f¯ (35)
+
∑
n 6=k
{
Ω2k+f,2n+fhn,j,f + Ω2k+f,2n+f¯hn,j,f¯
}
+ w′k,j,f ,
where f, f¯ ∈ {0, 1} and f¯ , f + (−1)f . The second term on
the right-hand side of (35) represents the effect of the multiuser
interference caused by the active IoT devices in the network.
Due to the central limit theorem (CLT), hˆk,j,f , f ∈ {0, 1}, in
(35) given hypothesis H0k and H1k can be accurately approx-
imated by complex Gaussian random variables for sufficiently
small values of K-factor κk , |µk|2/σ2k and large enough
PaKu. Simulation results show that for κk , |µk|2/σ2k < 0.2,
Gaussian assumption is valid. In fact, the lower κk, the more
reliable the Gaussian assumption is. It should be mentioned
that the random variables hˆk,j,0 and hˆk,j,1 are not joint Gaus-
sian random variables as shown in Fig. 7. The mean, variance,
and cross-correlation of hˆk,j,0 and hˆk,j,1 are given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. First and second order statistics of the recon-
structed signal for the kth IoT device in (35), i.e., hˆk,j,0 and
hˆk,j,1, are given as follows
E
{
hˆk,j,0
∣∣Htk} = E{hˆk,j,1∣∣Htk} = 0, t ∈ {0, 1} (36)
Σtkf,f , Var
{
hˆk,j,f
∣∣Htk} = E{∣∣hˆk,j,f ∣∣2∣∣Htk} (37)
= tγk
(
Ω22k+f,2k+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2k+f¯
)
+ Pa
∑
n6=k
γn
(
Ω22k+f,2n+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2n+f¯
)
+ Σw
′
2k+f,2k+f ,
and
Σtk0,1 = Cov
{
hˆk,j,0, hˆk,j,1
∣∣Htk} = E{hˆk,j,0hˆ∗k,j,1∣∣Htk}
= tγk
(
Ω2k,2kΩ2k+1,2k + Ω2k+1,2k+1Ω2k,2k+1
)
+ Pa
∑
n 6=k
γn
(
Ω2k,2nΩ2k+1,2n + Ω2k+1,2n+1Ω2k,2n+1
)
+Σw
′
2k,2k+1, (38)
where γk = ηkpk(σ2k + |µk|2), Σtk1,0 = Σtk0,1, t, f ∈ {0, 1},
f¯ , f + (−1)f , and Σw′2k+f,2k+f is given in (34) (Proof in
Appendix I)
Since the joint PDF of hˆk,j,0 and hˆk,j,1 given Htk, i.e.,
p
(
hˆk,j,0, hˆk,j,1|Htk
)
, t ∈ {0, 1}, cannot be expressed in a
tractable mathematical form and since there is high correlation
between hˆk,j,0 and hˆk,j,1, we can either use hˆk,j,0 or hˆk,j,1 to
identify the transmission state of the kth IoT device. More-
over, the in-phase and quadrature components of hˆk,j,f can be
accurately approximated by correlated joint Gaussian random
variables due to the CLT for sufficiently small values of K-
factor κk , |µk|2/σ2k and large enough PaKu. To verify the
credibility of Gaussian assumption, we evaluate the kurtosis
and skewness for Re{hˆk,j,0} and Re{hˆk,j,1} in Table I.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that the
distribution of the reconstructed signal for the kth IoT device
is given as follows[
Re{hˆk,j,0}
Im{hˆk,j,0}
]
∼
{
N (0,C0k0,0), H0k
N (0,C1k0,0), H1k , (39)
and [
Re{hˆk,j,1}
Im{hˆk,j,1}
]
∼
{
CN (0,C0k1,1) , H0k
CN (0,C1k1,1) , H1k , (40)
8Table I: Credibility of Gaussian assumption for hˆk,j,0 and hˆk,j,1.
Variable Kurtosis Skewness Variance
Gaussian (theory) 3 0 0.002 {0.2657}
Re{hˆk,j,0} 3.105 0.0224 0.001
Re{hˆk,j,1} 3.014 −0.0233 {0.2643}
where
Ctkf,f =
[
Σ¯tkf,f ρ
tk
f,f
ρtkf,f Σ˜
tk
f,f
]
, (41)
ρtkf,f = E
{
Re{hˆk,j,f} Im{hˆk,j,f}
∣∣Htk} (42)
= tµ¯kµ˜kηkpk
(
Ω22k+f,2k+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2k+f¯
)
+ Pa
∑
n 6=k
µ¯nµ˜nηnpn
(
Ω22k+f,2n+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2n+f¯
)
,
Σ¯tkf,f , Var
{
Re{hˆk,j,f}
∣∣Htk} = E{(Re{hˆk,j,f})2∣∣Htk}
= t(σ2k/2 + |µ¯k|2)ηkpk
(
Ω22k+f,2k+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2k+f¯
)
+ Pa
∑
n 6=k
(σ2n/2 + |µ¯n|2)ηnpn
(
Ω22k+f,2n+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2n+f¯
)
+ Σw
′
2k+f,2k+f/2, (43)
and
Σ˜tkf,f , Var
{
Im{hˆk,j,f}
∣∣Htk} = E{( Im{hˆk,j,f})2∣∣Htk}
= t(σ2k/2 + |µ˜k|2)ηkpk
(
Ω22k+f,2k+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2k+f¯
)
+ Pa
∑
n 6=k
(σ2n/2 + |µ˜n|2)ηnpn
(
Ω22k+f,2n+f + Ω
2
2k+f,2n+f¯
)
+ Σw
′
2k+f,2k+f/2, (44)
with µ¯k , Re{µk} and µ˜k , Im{µk}.
The larger the ratio of the variances in (39) and (40), i.e.,
Σ1k0,0/Σ
0k
0,0, and Σ
1k
1,1/Σ
0k
1,1, the better identification performance.
Accordingly, we use the reconstructed signal in (35) for the
identification of the kth IoT device as follows
h˘k,j ,
[
Re{hˆk,j,1}
Im{hˆk,j,1}
]
I
{
%k < 0
}
+
[
Re{hˆk,j,0}
Im{hˆk,j,0}
]
I
{
%k > 0
}
,
(45)
where h˘k,j = [h˘k,j,0, h˘k,j,1]†, k ∈ Xu, and
%k =
(
Σ1k0,0
Σ0k0,0
− Σ
1k
1,1
Σ0k1,1
)
. (46)
Using the reconstructed signal in the form of (45) enables us
to derive closed-form expressions for the correct identification
and false alarm rates. In order to identify the transmission state
of the kth IoT device, k ∈ Xu, based on h˘k,j , the maximum
likelihood ratio (MLR) test can be used [22].
Lemma 2. The optimal MLR decision rule for IoT device
identification based on the reconstructed signal h˘k,j , k ∈ Xu,
in (45) is given by
dk =
{
H1k, φ
(
h˘k,j
)
> θk
H0k, φ
(
h˘k,j
)
< θk
, (47)
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Fig. 7: Scatter plot of Re{hˆ10,j,1} and Re{hˆ10,j,0} when device k =
10 is active, Ku = 1536, Nc = 512, Pa = 0.01, and SNR= 16 dB.
where
φ
(
h˘k,j
)
=
1∑
n=0
χf,f [n]z
2
k,j [n], (48)
χf,f [n] ,
λf,f [n]
λf,f [n] + 1
. (49)
In (49), λf,f [0] and λf,f [1] are the eigenvalues of the sym-
metric matrix B1kf,f , (A0kf,f )†C1kf,fA0kf,f , and
[zk,j [0], zk,j [1]]
† , (V 1kf,f )†(A0kf,f )†h˘k,j , (50)
where V 1kf,f is the modal matrix ofB
1k
f,f ,A
0k
f,f , V 0kf,f
(
Λ0kf,f
)−1
2 ,(
V 0kf,f
)†
C0kf,fV
0k
f,f = Λ
0k
f,f , and f = 1 for %k < 0, and f = 0
for %k > 0. The threshold value for the kth IoT device, i.e.,
θk, is set for a desirable probability of false alarm P
(f)
k ,
P
{
dk = H1k|H0k
}
as follows
P
(f)
k =
1
2pi
∫ +∞
θk
∫ +∞
−∞
1∏
n=0
exp(−jωx)√
1− 2jχf,f [n]ω
dωdx. (51)
By using (48), we can obtain the correct identification rate for
the kth IoT device as follows
P
(c)
k =
1
2pi
∫ +∞
θk
∫ +∞
−∞
1∏
n=0
exp(−jωx)√
1− 2jλf,f [n]ω
dωdx. (52)
(Proof in Appendix II)
The decisions corresponding to the L measurements for the
kth IoT device, i.e., dk,`, ` = 1, 2, . . . , L, can be fused together
as
Dk =
{
H1k,
∑L
`=1 dk,` > nk
H0k,
∑L
`=1 dk,` < nk,
, (53)
where nk is an integer value [23]. A formal description of
the proposed squared `2-norm SSR IoT device identification
algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
C. IoT Device Identification for Unknown Probability of Ac-
tivity
Here, we develop an IoT device identification algorithm for
the case of unknown probability of activity Pa at the BS. The
9Algorithm 1 Squared `2-norm SSR IoT device identification
Input: X , R, P (f)k , nk, k ∈ Xu
Output: Active IoT set Xˆa
Initialization: Xˆa = ∅
1: for k = 0, 1, . . . ,Ku − 1 do
2: Obtain θk by using (51)
3: Obtain h˘k,j by employing (27) and (45)
4: Compute φ
(
h˘k,j
)
for j = 0, 1, . . . , L− 1 using (48)
5: Identify the transmission state of the kth IoT device
by employing (47) and then (53)
6: if Dk = H1k then
7: Xˆa ← {Xˆa, k}
8: end if
9: end for
convex relaxation through `1 − `2 mixed-norm is employed
for signal reconstruction, which can directly identify the active
IoT devices through the non-zero elements of the reconstructed
signal. This is attributed to the `1 − `2 mixed-norm ability
to provide sparse estimates. Note that the proposed `1 − `2
mixed-norm SSSR IoT device identification algorithm does
not require knowledge of transmit power by IoT devices.
1) BIC `1− `2 Mixed-Norm SSSR IoT Device Identification
Algorithm: Let us consider Pa ∈ [0, Pmax], where Pa is
unknown at the BS, but the maximum probability of activity
Pmax is a priori known at the BS.
Since in-phase and quadrature components tend to be ei-
ther zero or non-zero simultaneously, this provides additional
grouping in SSSR. By stacking the in-phase and quadrature
components (X is a real-valued matrix), we can write (19) as
Y = XU + V, (54)
where
Y ,
[
Re{R} Im{R}] (55a)
U ,
[
Re{H} Im{H}] (55b)
V ,
[
Re{W} Im{W}]. (55c)
For block-sparse matrix U in (54), the `1 − `2 mixed-norm
SSSR is given as follows
Uˆ = arg min
U
1
2
∥∥Y −XU∥∥2
F
+Ndλg
Ku−1∑
k=0
∥∥uGk∥∥2, (56)
where Nd , 2LNc
uGk ,
[
U2k,· U2k+1,·
]
, (57)
and Uk,· is the kth row of U. In (56), λg represents the tuning
parameter which is unknown and time-varying. The degrees
of sparsity depends on λg; the larger λg is, the sparser the
estimate is. For unknown λg, model order selection methods
can be employed to identify active IoT devices. By extending
the BIC model order selection method in [24] to multiple
measurement vectors, the reconstructed matrix Uˆ is given by
Uˆ = Uˆ
(λˆ)
, (58)
where
λˆ = arg min
λ∈[λL,λU]
CBIC(λ), (59)
CBIC(λ) , log
( 1
Nd
∥∥∥Y −XUˆ(λ)∥∥2
F
)
+ log(Nd)
df
Nd
, (60)
Uˆ
(λ)
= arg min
U
1
2
∥∥Y −XU∥∥2
F
+Ndλ
Ku−1∑
k=0
∥∥uGk∥∥2, (61)
and df is the degree of freedom which is given as follows
df =
Ku−1∑
k=0
I
{∥∥uˆGk∥∥2 > 0}+ (2L− 1)Ku−1∑
k=0
∥∥uˆGk∥∥2∥∥uˆLSGk∥∥2 , (62)
where uˆLSGk is the LS estimate for the kth IoT device signal.
The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of
the optimization problem in (61) is given as
−Ψk +Ndλ uGk∥∥uGk∥∥2 = 0 if uGk 6= 0† (63a)∥∥Ψk∥∥2 6 Ndλ if uGk = 0†, (63b)
where
Ψk , ∇uGk
1
2
∥∥Y −XU∥∥2
F
(64)
=
[
X†·,2k(Y −XU) X†·,2k+1(Y −XU)
]
,
and X·,k is the kth column of X. Let us write Ψk as
Ψk = φk − uGkΛk (65)
where
φk =
[
X†·,2k(Y −XU−{2k,·}) X†·,2k+1(Y −XU−{2k+1,·})
]
,
(66)
and
Λk , diag
{
X†·,2kX·,2k, . . . ,X
†
·,2kX·,2k, (67)
X†·,2k+1X·,2k+1, . . . ,X
†
·,2k+1X·,2k+1
}
with U−{i,·} as the matrix U with the ith row being set to 0†.
The dimension of the diagonal matrix Λk is 4L× 4L.
From (63a) and (65), we have uGk
(
NdλI/
∥∥uGk∥∥2 +Λk)
= φk when the kth IoT device is active. In contrast, when the
kth IoT device is inactive, Ψk = φk. Hence, we can write
uGk = I
{
‖φk‖2 > Ndλ
}
φk
(
Ndλ∥∥uGk∥∥2 I +Λk
)−1
. (68)
To solve the optimization (61), we can use block-coordinate
descent algorithm, where consists of solving each uGk in (57)
at a time. By starting from a sparse solution like, Uˆ = 0, at
each iteration, we check for a given k whether uGk is optimal
or not based on the conditions in (63). If ‖φk‖2 6 Ndλ,
uˆGk = 0; otherwise, uGk at the tth iteration is iteratively
updated as
uˆ
[t]
Gk
= I
{
‖φ[t]k ‖2 > Ndλ
}
φ[t]k
(
Ndλ∥∥uˆ[t−1]Gk ∥∥2 I +Λk
)−1
, (69)
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Algorithm 2 BIC `1 − `2 mixed-norm SSSR IoT device
identification algorithm
Input: Y , X , Λk, k = 0, 1, . . . ,Ku − 1, λ ∈ [λL, λU],
MC, and MG
Output: Active IoT set Xˆa
Initialization: Xˆa = ∅, i = 1, Golden = 1, λ1 = λL
1: while Golden = 1 do
Uˆ[0] = UˆRD, t = 1, SSSR = 1
2: while SSSR = 1 do
3: for k = 0, 1, . . . ,Ku − 1 do
Obtain φ[t]k by employing (70)
4: if ‖φ[t]k ‖2 6 Ncλi then
uˆ
[t]
Gk
= 0
else
5: Update u[t]Gk as in (69)
end if
6: end for
7: if
(‖Uˆ[t] − Uˆ[t−1]‖ > c) ∩ (t < MC) then
8: t← t+ 1
9: else
Uˆ(λi) = Uˆ[t], SSSR = 0
end if
10: end while
i← i+ 1
11: if i = 2 then
λi = λU, Golden = 1
12: else if
(|λi−1 − λi−2| > g) ∩ (i < MG + 1) then
Find λi using the Golden selection search
Golden = 1
13: else
λˆ = arg min
λ∈{λi−1,λi−2}
CBIC(λ),
Uˆ = Uˆ(λˆ), Golden = 0,
14: end if
15: end while
16: Xˆa =
{∀k ∈ {0, . . .Ku − 1}∣∣‖uˆGk‖2 6= 0}.
where
φ[t]k =
[
X†·,2k(Y −XU[t−1]−{2k,·}) X†·,2k+1(Y −XU[t−1]−{2k+1,·})
]
.
(70)
This procedure continues until the absolute difference of suc-
cessive iterations becomes smaller than the tolerance value c.
2) Efficient One-dimensional Search: Efficient one dimen-
sional iterative search algorithms can be used to solve the
optimization problem in (59). In an iterative search method, the
interval [λL, λU] is repeatedly reduced on the basis of function
evaluations until a reduced bracket [λL, λU] is achieved which
is sufficiently small. These methods can be applied to any
function and differentiability of the function is not essential.
An iterative search method in which iterations can be per-
formed until the desired accuracy in either the minimizer or
the minimum value of the objective function is achieved is the
golden-section search method [25]. For a strictly unimodal
function with an extremum inside the interval, the Golden-
section search method finds that extremum, while for an in-
terval containing multiple extrema (possibly including the in-
terval boundaries), it converges to one of them.
Convergence of the Optimization Problem in (61): It has
been shown that for an optimization problem whose objective
function is the sum of a smooth and convex function and a non-
smooth but block-separable convex function, block-coordinate
descent optimization converges towards the global minimum
of the problem [26]. In (61), ‖Y−XU‖2F is a smooth and dif-
ferentiable convex function and
∑Ku−1
k=0 ‖uGk‖2 is a separable
penalty function, where ‖uGk‖2 is a continuous and convex
function with respect to uGk . Thus, block-coordinate descent
converges to the global minimum.
A formal description of the `1 − `2 mixed-norm SSSR IoT
identification algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2. In Al-
gorithm 2, MG and MC, denote the maximum number of itera-
tions for the Golden selection search and the block-coordinate
descent optimization, respectively.
IV. DATA DETECTION
The next step after IoT device identification is to detect
the data of devices identified as active. Since channel state
information (CSI) is unknown, the existing MUD algorithms,
such as SIC cannot be employed. In this section, we propose a
new nonlinear MUD algorithm which does not require channel
estimation for data detection.
A. 2-MC-MUD Algorithm
Fig. 8 shows the block diagram of the proposed 2-MC-
MUD algorithm. The output of the IoT device identification
algorithm is a set of IoT devices Xˆa. Since the delay of the IoT
devices are known, we can apply sequence matched filtering to
the small set of active IoT devices. Without loss of generality,
we assume that Xˆa , {k0, k1, . . . , kKˆa−1} and τk0 6 τk1 6
· · · 6 τkKˆa−1 , where Kˆa , card(Xˆa).
We consider a bank of Kˆa single-user matched filter (MF)s
for the identified active IoT devices in Xˆa, as shown in Fig.
8. The output of the MF after synchronized sampling and
normalization by Nc for the knth IoT device is expressed as
[27]
ykn,i ,
1
Nc
∫ τkn+(i+1)Ts
τkn+iTs
r(t)skn(t− iTs − τkn)dt (71)
= gknbkn,i+
∑
kj<kn
gkjbkj ,i+1ρknkj +
∑
kj<kn
gkjbkj ,iρkjkn
+
∑
kj>kn
gkjbkj ,iρknkj +
∑
kj>kn
gkjbkj ,i−1ρkjkn + wkn,i,
where wkn,i , σw
∫ τkn+(i+1)Ts
τkn+iTs
w(t)skn(t − iTs − τkn)dt,
ρknkj, 1Nc
∫ Ts
τkj
skn(t)skj (t−τkj )dt, and ρkjkn, 1Nc
∫ τkj
0 skn(t)
skj (t+ Ts − τkj )dt.
The output of the single-user MF in (71) for the knth IoT
device can be written as
ykn,i = gknbkn,i + vkn,i, i = 0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1, (72)
where vkn,i represents the effect of noise and multiuser inter-
ference on the knth IoT device.
For data detection without any sign ambiguity, the phase of
gkn , kn ∈ Xˆa, is leastwise required to be known at the BS.
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Fig. 8: Block diagram of the proposed 2-MC-MUD algorithm.
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Fig. 9: Separated symbols by the proposed 2-MC-MUD algorithm
for an active IoT device at 10 dB SNR, Ku = 768, and Nc = 512.
However, by employing differential coding at IoT devices, a
MUD algorithm can be developed which removes the need
for such a priori knowledge. Differential coding is a coding
technique used for non-coherent data detection. Instead of
encoding a bit sequence directly, it encodes the difference
between the bit sequence as bkn,i = bkn,i−1⊕bckn,i, kn ∈ Xa,
[21], where ⊕ is the modulo-2 addition and bckn,i is the ith bit
at the output of the channel encoder of the knth IoT device.
Since gkn , kn ∈ Xa, remains unchanged during the short
packet, the received symbols of the active IoT device kn in
(72) form two clusters corresponding to the transmitted bits
1 and 0. The main idea behind the proposed MUD algorithm
is to extract these two clusters regardless of which cluster
is labeled 1 or 0. By extracting the two clusters, the data
stream of the active IoT device kn can be detected without
any prior knowledge about the CSI and carrier phase (CP)
due to differential coding.
To extract these two clusters for each active IoT device,
the 2-MC algorithm can be employed. By applying the 2-MC
algorithm to ykn,i, i = 0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1, in (72), the two
clusters are separated based on the nearest mean criterion
disregard to the label. The 2-MC minimizes the within-cluster
sum of squares (WCSS), i.e, the sum of the squared Euclidean
distance [28]. Let us define U , {0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1}. The
2-MC algorithm partitions U into two sets Ukn,0 and Ukn,1
by minimizing the WCSS as follows
arg min
U
∑
i∈Ukn,0
∣∣ykn,i − μkn,0∣∣2 + ∑
i∈Ukn,1
∣∣ykn,i − μkn,1∣∣2,
subject to μkn,0 =
1
card(Ukn,0)
∑
i∈Ukn,0
ykn,i,
μkn,1 =
1
card(Ukn,1)
∑
i∈Ukn,1
ykn,i. (73)
The minimization problem in (73) can be solved by different
methods. One of the most common algorithm is the Lloyd’s
algorithm which uses an iterative refinement technique [29].
Given initial mean values μ[0]kn,0 and μ
[1]
kn,1
for μkn,0 and μkn,1
in (73), the Lloyd’s algorithm proceeds by alternating between
the assignment and updating steps as follows:
Assignment Step: The element of U at iteration t, i.e., U [t]
is assigned to U [t]kn,0 when
U [t]kn,0 =
{
i :
∣∣ykn,i − μ[t]kn,0∣∣2 6 ∣∣ykn,i − μ[t]kn,1∣∣2}. (74)
Otherwise, it is assigned to U [t]kn,1.
Updating Step: The mean of the the clusters U [t]kn,0 and U
[t]
kn,1
are updated as
μ[t+1]kn,1 =
1
card
(U [t]kn,1)
∑
i∈U [t]kn,1
ykn,i, (75a)
μ[t+1]kn,0 =
1
card
(U [t]kn,0)
∑
i∈U [t]kn,0
ykn,i. (75b)
The 2-MC algorithm converges when the assignment step does
not change. Fig. 9 shows the output of the 2-MC algorithm for
an active IoT device. As seen, the sequence at the output of
the MF is portioned into two clusters regardless of the label.
After partitioning U into two clusters Ukn,0 and Ukn,1, ykn,i,
i = 0, 1, . . . , Ns− 1, is mapped into a binary sequence bmkn ,
[bmkn,0 b
m
kn,1
. . . bmkn,Ns−1]
† with elements as
bmkn,i = I
{
i ∈ Ukn,1
}
. (76)
Then, by applying differential decoding to the mapped binary
sequence bmkn , the channel coded data stream for the active
IoT device kn is obtained as follows
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Algorithm 3 : 2-MC-MUD algorithm
Input: r(t), Xˆa, Kˆa = card(Xˆa)
Output: bˆkn , kn ∈ Xˆa
1: for n = 0, 1, . . . , Kˆa − 1 do
2: Set initial value for U [0]kn,1 and U
[0]
kn,0
3: Obtain ykn,i, i = 0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1, by employing (71)
4: while U [t+1]kn,1 6= U
[t]
kn,1
do
5: obtain U [t]kn,1 and U
[t]
kn,0
by employing (74)
6: μ[t+1]kn,1 ← U
[t]
kn,1
by employing (75a)
7: μ[t+1]kn,0 ← U
[t]
kn,0
by employing (75b)
8: end while
9: Obtain the binary mapped sequence bmkn through (76)
10: Apply differential decoding in (77) to bmkn to obtain bˆ
c
kn
11: Apply channel decoding to bˆckn to obtain dˆkn
12: end for
bˆckn,i = b
m
kn,i ⊕ bmkn,i−1. (77)
Finally, bˆckn ,
[
bˆckn,0 bˆ
c
kn,1
. . . bˆckn,Ns−2
]†
is decoded by
the channel decoder, and the data stream of the active IoT
device kn is obtained. The proposed 2-MC-MUD algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 3.
B. Complexity Analysis
The complexity of the proposed squared `2-norm SSR IoT
device identification algorithm is O(KuLN2c + LN3c ). The
complexity of the proposed BIC `1−`2 mixed-norm SSSR IoT
device identification algorithm per each iteration isO(NcLK2u),
where the maximum number of iterations is MGMC (MG and
MC are the maximum number of iterations for the Golden se-
lection search and the block-coordinate descent optimization,
respectively. The complexity of the proposed 2-MC-MUD for
single user matched filtering and clustering is O(N2cNska) and
O(KuNska), respectively, where ka = card(Xa).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed
IoT device identification algorithms and the 2-MC-MUD al-
gorithm through several simulation experiments.
A. Simulation Setup
We considered an IoT network with Ku = 1024 IoT de-
vices. It is assumed that the spreading sequences of the IoT
devices are random binary codes with spreading factor Nc =
512. Unless otherwise specified, the overloading factor is OF ,
Ku/Nc = 2. Each IoT packet is 128 bits with payload length
of 40 bits. A polar code with list size 8 and code rate 40/128
was adopted for channel coding. The delay of the IoT devices
was generated as uniform distributions αk ∼ Ud
[
0, 5
]
, βk ∼
Ud
[
0, 511
]
, and ξk ∼ Uc
[
0, 1
)
. The effect of the unknown
CSI and CP for each IoT device was modeled as independent
complex Gaussian random variables with mean µk =
√
0.1 +
j
√
0.1 and variance σ2k = 1, k ∈ Xu, i.e., Rician fading with
K-factor 0.2 was considered. The average system SNR was
defined as ϑ , P¯a
∑
(|µk|2 + σ2k)pkηk/σ2w, where pk = ς/ηk
(ς changes according to ϑ), P¯a = Pa for Algorithm 1, P¯a =
Pmax/2 for Algorithm 2 (for the case of time-varying Pa),
and σ2w = 1 is the variance of the additive noise. The range of
tuning parameter for the BIC minimization in (59) was set as
λ = [0 500], g = 2, and MG = 20. The performance of the
proposed IoT device identification algorithms were evaluated
in terms of system correct identification and system false alarm
rates, which are calculated as follows
PC =
1
NMC
NMC∑
n=1
card
(Xˆa[n] ∩ Xa[n])
card
(Xa[n]) ,
and
PF =
1
NMC
NMC∑
n=1
card
(Xˆa[n])− card(Xˆa[n] ∩ Xa[n])
Ku − card
(Xa[n]) ,
where NMC = 104 is the number of Monte Carlo trials,
and Xa[n] and Xˆa[n] are the true and estimated active IoT
device set at the nth Monte Carlo trial, respectively. Also,
the performance of the proposed 2-MC-MUD algorithm was
evaluated in terms of average packet error rate (PER) in the
presence IoT device identification error.
B. Simulation Results
Fig. 10 depicts PC and PF of the proposed squared `2-
norm SSR IoT device identification algorithm (Algorithm 1)
versus SNR for different values of Pa and P
(k)
f , Ku = 1024,
and L = 1. The threshold values θk, k ∈ Xu, are set by using
(51). As seen, Algorithm 1 can offer high correct identification
error rate even for a single observation vector. Also, there is an
insignificant gap between PC obtained in the simulation exper-
iment and the theoretical result in (52). Similarly, PF matches
the preset false alarm rate, i.e., P (k)f ∈ {0.03, 0.04, 0.05},
k ∈ Xu. We note from Fig. 10 that the theoretical results
more accurately match the simulation results at higher Pa and
at lower SNRs since the CLT is more reliable and the deviation
from the Gaussian distribution is lower.
In Fig. 11, we compare the performance of Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 with the Alternating Direction Method of
Multipliers (ADMM) using GCV [30] for Pa = 0.02, Ku =
1024, and L = 21. For Algorithm 1, the threshold values
θk, k ∈ Xu, are set for P fk = 0.05 in (51), and nk = 4
and 5 are used for hard decision combining in (53). As seen,
while Algorithm 1 outperforms Algorithm 2 and the ADMM-
GCV algorithm at lower values of SNR, Algorithm 2 exhibits
superior performance at higher SNRs. We notice that the per-
formance improvement of Algorithm 1 for L = 21 is not very
high compared to L = 1 in Fig. 10 since p
(
hˆk,j1,m, hˆk,j2,m
|Htk
) 6= p(hˆk,j1,m|Htk)p(hˆk,j2,m|Htk), j1 6= j2, t ∈ {0, 1}.
Fig. 12 illustrates PC and PF of the proposed BIC `1 − `2
mixed-norm SSSR IoT device identification algorithm versus
SNR for different overloading factors when the probability of
activity varies uniformly in the range Pa ∈ [0, 0.06]. As seen,
the proposed algorithm exhibits high correct identification rate
for high overloading factors, such as OF = 2 (1024 devices),
when Pa is unknown and time-varying. Also, the false alarm
rate of the proposed algorithm is significantly low for the SNR
values lower than 15 dB due to the capability of the BIC `1−`2
mixed-norm SSSR algorithm to exploit block sparsity.
Fig. 13 compares the performance of the developed MA
scheme when the proposed 2-MC-MUD and differentially co-
13
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
(a) PC versus SNR
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
(b) PF versus SNR
Fig. 10: The system correct identification rate, PC, and false alarm rate, PF, of the proposed squared `2-norm SSR IoT device identification
algorithm (Algorithm 1) versus overloading factor for different values of Pa, P
(k)
f ∈ {0.03, 0.04, 0.05}, Ku = 1024, and L = 1.
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Fig. 11: Performance comparison of the proposed IoT device identification algorithms with the ADMM-GCV algorithm [30] for Pa = 0.02,
Ku = 1024, and L = 21.
herent decorrelation (DCD)-MUD [27] algorithms are employed
for non-coherent data detection. As seen, the proposed MUD
algorithm outperforms the DCD-MUD [27]. This superiority in
performance is related to the capability of the 2-MC algorithm
to accurately separate the two clusters of data.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new uncoordinated uplink MA for mMTC with short-
packet and sporadic traffic was proposed in this paper. The
proposed MA scheme reduces the control signaling associated
with the MAC and PHY layers. Instead of transmitting the
device identifier using a portion of bits in a packet, the squared
`2-norm SSR and BIC `1 − `2 mixed-norm SSSR IoT device
identification algorithms were proposed to identify active IoT
devices through the assigned unique non-orthogonal spreading
code to each IoT device. To further reduce the overhead, we
removed the preambles and pilots used for channel estimation
by developing the non-coherent 2-MC-MUD algorithm based
on unsupervised machine learning.
APPENDIX I
By applying the statistical expectation to (35) and employ-
ing E
{
hk,j,1|Htk
}
= 0 and E
{
hk,j,0|Htk
}
= 0, we can write
E
{
hˆk,j,f |Htk
}
= 0, t, f ∈ {0, 1}. To obtain the variance of
hˆk,j,f given Htk, i.e., Σtkf,f , we use the variance sum law as
follows
Var
{∑
i
aizi
}
=
∑
i
(
|ai|2Var
{
zi
}
+
∑
j 6=i
aia
∗
jCov
{
zi, zj
})
. (78)
Since hk1,j,f , hk2,j,f¯ , and w
′
k,j,f , k, k1, k2 ∈ Xu, in (35),
are zero-mean and uncorrelated random variables, by applying
(78) to (35), we obtain (79) at the top of next page.
By using (17), Var{hk,j,f |H1k}, f ∈ {0, 1}, in (79) can be
written as
Var
{
hk,j,f |Htk
}
= Var
{
gkbk,j−αk−1+f |Htk
}
(80)
= E
{
Var
{
gkbk,j−αk−1+f |gk, Htk
}}
+ Var
{
E
{
gkbk,j−αk−1+f |gk, Htk
}}
.
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Σtkf,f = Var
{
hˆk,j,f |Htk
}
= E
{|hˆk,j,f |2|Htk} = tΩ22k+f,2k+fVar{hk,j,f |Htk}+ tΩ22k+f,2k+f¯Var{hk,j,f¯ |Htk} (79)
+
∑
n 6=k Ω
2
2k+f,2n+fVar
{
hn,j,f |Htk
}
+
∑
n 6=n Ω
2
2k+f,2n+f¯Var
{
hn,j,f¯ |Htk
}
+ Var
{
w′k,j,f
}
.
Σ1k0,1 = Cov
{
hˆk,j,0, hˆk,j,1|Htk
}
= E
{
hˆk,j,0hˆ
∗
k,j,1|Htk
}
= t
(
Ω2k,2kΩ2k+1,2k
)
E
{|hk,j,0|2|Htk} (86)
+ t
(
Ω2k+1,2k+1Ω2k,2k+1
)
E
{|hk,j,1|2|Htk}+∑
n 6=k Ω2k,2nΩ2k+1,2nE
{|hn,j,0|2|Htk}
+
∑
n6=k Ω2k+1,2n+1Ω2k,2n+1E
{|hn,j,1|2|Htk}+ E{w′k,j,0(w′k,j,1)∗|Htk}.
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Fig. 12: The system correct identification rate, PC, and false alarm rate, PF, of the proposed BIC `1 − `2 mixed-norm SSSR IoT device
identification algorithm (Algorithm 2) versus SNR and overloading factor for random probability of activity Pa ∈ [0 0.06] and L = 21.
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Fig. 13: PER of the proposed MA scheme when 2-MC-MUD and
DCD-MUD [27] algorithms are employed for non-coherent data
detection at the BS (Ku = 768, OF = 1.5, and Pa ∈ [0, 0.06]).
Since Var
{
bk,j−αk−1+f |Htk
}
= t, t, f ∈ {0, 1}, we can write
E
{
Var
{
gkbk,j−αk−1+f |gk, Htk
}}
(81)
= E
{|gk|2}Var{bk,j−αk−1+f |Htk} = t(σ2k + |µk|2)ηkpk.
By substituting (81) and E
{
gkbk,j−αk−1+f |gk, Htk
}
= 0, f ∈
{0, 1}, into (80), we obtain
Var
{
hk,j,f |Htk
}
= t(σ2k + |µk|2)ηkpk. (82)
Similar to (80), for n 6= k and f ∈ {0, 1}, we can write
Var
{
hn,j,f |Htk
}
= Var
{
gnbn,j−αn−1+f |Htk
}
(83)
= E
{
Var
{
gnbn,j−αn−1+f |gn, Htk
}}
+ Var
{
E
{
gnbn,j−αn−1+f |gn, Htk
}}
.
Because Var
{
bn,j−αn−1+f |Htk
}
= Var
{
bn,j−αn−1+f
}
=
Pa, n 6= k, f ∈ {0, 1}, we can write
E
{
Var
{
gnbk,j−αn−1+f |gn, Htk
}}
(84)
= E
{|gn|2}Var{bn,j−αn−1+f |Htk} = Pa(σ2n + |µn|2)ηnpn.
By substituting (84) and E
{
gnbk,j−αn−1+f |gn, Htk
}
= 0,
f ∈ {0, 1}, into (83), we obtain
Var
{
hn,j,f |Htk
}
= Pa(σ
2
n + |µn|2)ηnpn. (85)
Finally, by substituting (82), (85), Var{w′k,j,f} = Σw
′
2k+f,2k+f
into (79), (37) is derived. For the cross-correlation of hˆk,j,0 and
hˆk,j,1, we obtain (86), where by substituting (82) and (85) into
(86), and then by using E{w′k,j,0(w′k,j,1)∗ |Htk} = Σw
′
2k,2k+1,
results in (38).
APPENDIX II
By employing the MLR test, the transmission state of the
kth IoT device is identified as active, i.e., dk = H1k, if
p
(
h˘k,j |H1k
)
p
(
h˘k,j |H0k
) = 2pi|C0kf,f |
1
2 exp
(
− 12 h˘†k,j(C1kf,f )−1h˘k,j
)
2pi|C1kf,f |
1
2 exp
(
− 12 h˘†k,j(C0kf,f )−1h˘k,j
) > λ,
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where λ = (1 − Pa)/Pa. A canonical form of the above
detector is given by [22]
h˘†k,j(C
0k
f,f )
−1(C1kf,f )(C
1k
f,f +C
0k
f,f )
−1h˘k,j > θk, (87)
where θk is determined based on desirable false alarm rate for
the kth IoT device. Let us write C0kf,f = V
0k
f,fΛ
0k
f,f (V
0k
f,f )
−1,
where V 0kf,f is an square matrix whose columns are eigen-
vectors of C0kf,f , and Λ
0k
f,f is a diagonal matrix where its ith
diagonal element is the eigenvalue associated with the ith col-
umn of C0kf,f . We define A
0k
f,f = V
0k
f,f (Λ
0k
f,f )
− 12 and B1kf,f ,
(A0kf,f )
†C1kf,fA
0k
f,f . Taking into account (V
0k
f,f )
†V 0kf,f = I , we
can show that (A0kf,f )
†C0kf,fA
0k
f,f = I . Then, using this result,
the canonical detector in (87) can be written as follows
h˘†k,jA
0k
f,fB
1k
f,f (B
1k
f,f + I)
−1(A0kf,f )
†h˘k,j > θk. (88)
Based on eigenvalue decomposition of B0kf,f , we have
B1kf,f , (A0kf,f )†C1kf,fA0kf,f = V 1kf,fΛ1kf,f (V 1kf,f )−1, (89)
where V 1kf,f and Λ
1k
f,f are the eigenvector and eigenvalue ma-
trices of B1kf,f , respectively. Since B
1k
f,f is a symmetric matrix,
we have (V 1kf,f )
†V 1kf,f = I . By letting zk,j , [zk,j [0], zk,j [1]]† ,
(V 1kf,f )
†(A0kf,f )
†h˘k,j in (88), we obtain
z†k,jΛ
1k
f,f (Λ
1k
f,f + I)
−1zk,j > θk, (90)
which is equivalent to the test statistics in (48) and (49). Note
that the matrix A0kf,fV
1k
f,f diagonalizes both C
0k
f,f and C
1k
f,f
By employing (48) and (49), the false alarm rate for the kth
IoT device is derived as follows
P
(f)
k = P
{
dk = H1k
∣∣H0k} (91)
= P
{ 1∑
n=0
χf,f [n]z
2
k,j [n] > θk
∣∣H0k}.
To obtain the PDF of U ,
∑1
n=0 χf,f [n]z
2
k,j [n] in (91), we
need to derive its characteristic function (CF) and then express
the PDF as the inverse Fourier transform. Since z2k,j [n] in (48)
under hypothesis H0k follows the central Chi-squared (χ2)
distribution with 1 degrees of freedom and the fact that z2k,j [0]
and z2k,j [1] are independent random variables, we obtain the
CF of U as follows
φU(ω) , E{exp(jωU)} =
1∏
n=0
1√
1− 2jχf,f [n]ω
, (92)
where χf,f [n] is given (49). Taking the inverse Fourier trans-
form of φU(ω), we have
pU(u|H0k) = 1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
1∏
n=0
exp(−jωu)√
1− 2jχf,f [n]ω
dω. (93)
Using (93), the false alarm rate for the kth IoT device is
obtained as in (51). Following the same procedure, the correct
identification rate for the kth IoT device in (52) is derived.
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